Digital Sovereignty Does Not End at the Data Center
An application can be fully operated in Germany and still rely on US infrastructure for every single access.
Blog
Cloud-Native Insights & Expertise
Discover our latest articles about cloud-native technologies, Kubernetes, DevOps, and modern software development. From practical tutorials to in-depth analyses.
Latest Blog Posts
Stay up to date with our latest articles about cloud-native technologies, Kubernetes, and DevOps.
1210 posts
DNS, Routing, Anycast: Why Europe's Cloud Also Needs Its Own Edge
We recently introduced the ayedo Edge Cloud, a European edge infrastructure for DNS, Anycast, load balancing, web application firewall, DDoS protection, and controlled access to applications.
Building the Edge — Part 1
The more powerful our platforms have become, the simpler their architecture seems at first glance.
TLS Certificates for Public Kubernetes Endpoints
TLS for Kubernetes does not necessarily end at the Ingress. Central TLS termination at the ayedo Edge Cloud simplifies certificate management, WAF integration, and traffic control. However, additional encryption up to the cluster protects further network segments. The right decision depends on trust boundaries, operating model, compliance, and desired fault isolation.
DNS Automation for Kubernetes Behind the Edge Cloud
Kubernetes DNS and public name resolution address different challenges. Cluster resources are aware of services, ingresses, and workloads; the Edge Cloud manages public endpoints, DNS zones, and backend forwarding. A resilient operational model separates these responsibilities but automates their handovers through clearly defined interfaces.
Operating Load Balancers for Kubernetes Independently of Providers
A Kubernetes Service of type `LoadBalancer` often ties public access to the respective cloud or infrastructure provider. An independent edge layer separates this responsibility from the cluster: routing, protection, TLS, and accessibility are centrally organized, while Kubernetes can be operated at ayedo or another provider. This reduces provider dependencies and simplifies multi-cloud architectures.
Securely Accessing the Kubernetes API Server Over the Edge
A publicly accessible Kubernetes API server doesn't need to allow direct internet access to its backend address. A preceding edge layer can handle routing, TLS, DDoS protection, and backend cloaking. The key remains the separation between public accessibility, cryptographic authentication, and actual authorization within the cluster.
Ingress and Edge Cloud: Clearly Separating Responsibilities
Kubernetes Ingress and Edge Cloud serve different purposes. The Edge Cloud controls the public entry point, protects applications, and terminates TLS. In contrast, Kubernetes Ingress describes the routing within the cluster. A clear separation prevents duplicate rules, contradictory security configurations, and complex operational states.
Making Security Decisions at the Edge Transparent
Edge Security Monitoring reveals how protective measures impact public traffic. Traffic and usage statistics help operationally assess WAF rules, DDoS protection, and exposed endpoints. However, they do not fully explain individual attacks nor replace logs, traces, and application-centric security telemetry.
Multi-Cloud Security with Centralized Edge Architecture
Multi-Cloud Security often fails not due to a lack of protective features, but because of its distributed implementation. A centralized edge architecture consolidates public access, WAF, DDoS protection, TLS termination, and routing in front of heterogeneous backends. Provider independence, an autonomous system, and active-active operation reduce control and dependency points.
Integrating DDoS Protection with Application Logic at the Edge
DDoS protection and application security address different levels of attacks. The edge can assess volume, protocols, connection rates, and request patterns to discard malicious traffic early. However, whether a valid request is being misused can often only be determined in the application context. Effective protection combines both levels with clear responsibilities.
TLS, WAF, and Backend: A Layered Architecture
A robust **security layered architecture** distributes protection tasks across different levels: TLS secures the transport connection, the WAF evaluates HTTP requests, and the backend remains responsible for authorization, validation, and data protection. The critical points are the handover points between these layers. Each decryption, forwarding, and protocol conversion creates its own trust and operational requirements.
Distributing Security Functions Between Edge and Application
Security functions should not be confined to a single location. The edge is suitable for protective measures with high visibility, significant scaling needs, and standardizable rules. The application remains responsible for identity, authorization, and business access controls. Key factors include context requirements, misconfiguration risks, and how early an attack can be detected and mitigated.
Systematically Reducing Public Attack Surfaces
A public attack surface is not just created by individual vulnerabilities, but by the entire internet-exposed architecture. Anycast Loadbalancing, WAF, DDoS Protection, TLS Termination, and Backend Cloaking must therefore be considered as an interconnected security zone in front of the backends. The key is which traffic actually reaches the backends and under what conditions.
Architectural Planning for TLS Termination at the Edge
TLS termination at the edge shortens the path from client to protected entry point but shifts responsibilities. Certificates, trust boundaries, and backend connections must therefore be planned separately. The central question is not whether TLS ends at the public entrance, but which connections remain encrypted afterwards and how their identities are verified.
Backend Cloaking as a Component of Edge Security
Backend Cloaking reduces the direct public accessibility of origin services by preventing clients from communicating directly with the backends. This decreases the public attack surface but does not replace WAF rules or application protection. Key factors include clean routing, controlled backend access, and an operational model for health checks and failover.
DDoS Protection at the Edge and Its Limitations in the Backend
DDoS protection at the edge reduces volumetric and network-based attack pressure before it reaches a company's public infrastructure. Scrubbing thus protects the entry to applications and APIs. However, it does not replace backend security, authentication, resource limits, or domain-specific checks against misuse.
WAF at the Edge: Rules, Limits, and Operational Models
A WAF at the edge inspects HTTP and HTTPS requests before they reach backends. It is suitable for protocol and request-specific patterns like injection, unauthorized methods, or suspicious request structures. However, the application remains responsible for business context, logic, and complex authorization. A crucial operational model controls both protection effectiveness and false alarm risk.
Health Checks as the Foundation of Stable Traffic Paths
Health Checks in load balancing assess not only whether a backend network target is reachable. Crucially, they determine if the service can actually process requests. The results influence pool states, failover, and traffic management. Thus, Health Checks become the foundation for reliable backend selection and stable public access paths.
Controlling Traffic Paths with TLS and Proxy Protocol
A stable traffic path doesn't end at TLS termination. The key is the coordinated interaction of TLS endpoint, routing, backend selection, health checks, and Proxy Protocol. The edge determines the public connection path; the application must decide how to process transmitted client information and which protocol parameters it accepts.
L7 Routing for APIs: Rules, Pools, and Backends
L7 routing distributes API requests not just by IP address or port, but based on application characteristics. Path, hostname, HTTP method, or headers can direct to different backend pools. Clear rules, defined priorities, and a clean boundary between edge routing and internal application logic are crucial.
Anycast and Backend Failover in Active-Active Operations
Active-active failover is not achieved through a single mechanism but through the interplay of Anycast, distributed edge PoPs, robust health checks, and dynamic backend selection. When a backend fails, the edge must detect the state and distribute new connections to available backends without relying on a central primary path.
Separating Network Routing and Application Routing
Network routing and application routing solve different problems. Anycast and Layer 4 determine how traffic reaches an edge entry and to which transport destination it proceeds. In contrast, Layer 7 decides based on hostnames, paths, or HTTP properties which service processes the request. These layers must be modeled separately to keep architecture, operations, and troubleshooting manageable.
Correctly Implementing Proxy Protocol in the Backend Pool
Proxy Protocol transmits connection information from a proxy or load balancing layer to the backend. This allows applications to evaluate the original client IP and other transport data. Prerequisites include a coordinated protocol, compatible listeners, and consistent configuration across the entire backend pool.